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Who Cares about Racial Inequality?
GLENN C. LOURY
Boston University
Institute on Race and Social Division
The issue of Affirmative Action is discussed, identifying some difficulties
with the way that this policy has been pursued in the past: Racial preferences
can be a poorly targeted method of closing the gap in social status between
Blacks and Whites, and can have negative unintended consequences for
incentives and for the reputations of its beneficiaries. Nevertheless, it
is argued that some form of affirmative action continues to be needed.
The concept of "developmental affirmative action" is introduced. This
form of racially targeted policy focuses primarily on the enhancement
of competitive skills. In so doing, it avoids many of the aforementioned
difficulties.
INTRODUCTION
I have been known over the years as a critic of affirmative
action policies. However, in the wake of a successful ballot ini-
tiative banning affirmative action in the state of California, I now
find it necessary to reiterate the old, and in my view still valid,
arguments on behalf of explicit public efforts to reduce racial in-
equality In doing so, I want to stress that I am not defending racial
quotas, or race-based allocations of public contracts, or racial
double standards in the workplace, or huge disparities in the test
scores of blacks and whites admitted to elite universities. These
practices are deservedly under attack. But, I do defend the U.S.
Army's programs to commission more black officers, the public
funding of efforts to bring blacks into science and engineering,
the attempts by urban law enforcement agencies to recruit black
personnel, and the goal of top universities-public and private-
to retain some racial diversity in their student bodies. The mere
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fact that these efforts take race into account, I will argue here,
should not be disqualifying.
My basic position is that the current campaign against "pref-
erences" goes too far by turning what prior to Proposition 209
had been a reform movement to which I was happy to belong
into an abolitionist's crusade that I feel constrained to oppose.'
True enough, the slogan "mend it, don't end it" was a cynical
device, used by a president heavily dependent on black political
support who sought to avoid genuine reform. But, taken seri-
ously, this slogan describes pretty well what our national policy
should be.
The most zealous affirmative action abolitionists hold as their
fundamental principle that knowing the race of the persons bur-
dened or benefited by a public action can never legitimately
influence the desirability of that action. Yet, moral queasiness
about the use of race arises for historically specific reasons-
namely, slavery and Jim Crow segregation. Those reasons cen-
trally involve the caste-like subordination of blacks, a matter that,
in actual historical fact, was not symmetrical as between the races.
As such, to take account of race while trying to mitigate the effects
of this subordination, thought certainly ill advised or unworkable
in specific cases, should not be viewed as morally equivalent to
the acts of discrimination that affected the subjugation of blacks
in the first place.
It is important to distinguish here between legal and ethical
modes of reasoning. Justice Scalia's famous dictum that "the
rule of law requires a law of rules" militates in favor of the
simple prohibition of all racial discrimination by public agents.
But, the moral case is not so straightforward. I stipulate that an
isolated individual's race, as such, is ethically irrelevant. That is,
the weight given to an affected person's welfare when selecting a
course of public action should not depend on race. Nevertheless,
there are circumstances where the ability of a public policy to
advance the general interest of all persons is enhanced by taking
cognizance of the racial identities of particular persons. Under
these circumstances, the steadfast refusal to take into account
how a policy might impact members of different racial groups, in




Of course it is a basic principle of political liberalism-some-
times called the "non-discrimination principle"-that personal
characteristics like race, sex, and ethnicity should have no moral
relevance. 2 People are to be valued as individuals, not as the
representatives of groups. In the economic theory of social choice,
for example, this idea is captured by the concept of "anonymity":
the idea that the legitimacy of any given government benefit
depends upon the fact that it is distributed without regard to
the identities, as distinct from the conditions, of those who get
the benefit and those who do not. This is the ideal.
However, ordinary people are not as fastidious as are social
choice theorists. They do care, sometimes passionately, about the
social identities of those who are helped or harmed by their gov-
ernment's policies. As Tip O'Neill once said, all politics is local.
This implies that no politics can be truly anonymous. Government
must be responsive to a public that is often motivated by group
loyalties and antagonisms. At the same time, ideally it should not
distribute benefits or burdens to citizens based on traits that are
morally irrelevant, such as race.
For multicultural America, this poses a permanent, intractable
dilemma. How can we manage it? Some say that all government
policies should be "color-blind." And, given our troubled racial
history, the simplicity and clarity of this color-blind formulation
can, indeed, seem compelling. But, the problem is more com-
plicated than this "simple" position can accommodate. For, by
focusing intensely on how government treats citizens in discrete
encounters, advocates of color-blindness give too little weight
to the purposes government is trying to achieve when it acts. I
maintain that procedural color blindness is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for the attainment of substantive racial
justice. Public policy can be color-blind yet unfairly contrary to
the interests of a racial minority-"benign neglect" being the
most obvious example. Conversely, policies that are intended
to have wide beneficial impact, regardless of race, may require
that cognizance be taken of the reality of racial identity. This
occurs, for example, when a president, to enhance the legiti-
macy of his government among the nation as a whole, tries to
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ensure that his top appointments are, to some degree, racially
representative.
The distinction between procedural and substantive justice,
between means and ends, is of little interest to the color-blind
purist, however. In fact, these days you often hear conservatives
spuriously likening the defenders of affirmative action to the
southern segregationists. For instance, Todd Gaziano wrote in
the May-June 1998 issue of Policy Review, published by the Her-
itage Foundation, as follows: "Forty years ago many Americans
felt anger and disgust toward segregationists such as Arkansas
Governor Orval Faubus who earned their place in history as lead-
ers of the massive resistance to desegregation. Today's massive
resistance to racial equality is led by another former governor of
Arkansas, Bill Clinton." This is irresponsible hyperbole bordering
on the absurd.
Is it not obvious that the racial sentiments to which Orval
Faubus was responding to were morally illegitimate and unde-
serving of ratification by government action? And, is it not equally
obvious that not all racial sentiments are of this kind?
Thus, we arrive at the fundament question: Why should we
care about racial inequality per se? What is wrong with a situation
in which blacks are roughly 12 percent of the U.S. population, but
some 40 percent of welfare recipients, 50 percent of incarcerated
felons, and 3 percent of newly graduating engineers? Why should
we care about the racial composition of the police forces in large
cities, of Presidential appointees to the federal bench, or of the
freshman class at a state university? Why should a large corpora-
tion actively seek a qualified black candidate for a position in its
upper management? After all, thinking in the abstract, a growing
welfare population or an increasing number of incarcerated felons
is a problem for society no matter what the color of those citizens.
What matters is that we reduce the total numbers, right?
Actually, I will argue that this is not right, or at least not for
America, not today. A President who appoints hundreds of local
federal judges among whom there are no blacks invites a wholly
unnecessary political firestorm. He would rightly find himself in
trouble. A corporation that neglects to bring along some blacks
into upper management exposes itself needlessly to potential
difficulties with its customers or its lower-level employees. A
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racially diverse big city fielding a nearly all white police force
is asking for big trouble the next time a drunken black motorist
has to be forcibly subdued. A freshman class devoid of blacks
teaches it students some lessons about our society that are not
listed in the course catalog. And to accept with equanimity the
blackening of our prisons or welfare rolls is to be indifferent, I
suggest, to an important aspect of social justice.
REASONS TO CARE
A. Racial Identities Matter
One reason to care about racial inequality is that race forms an
important part of the personal identity of many citizens. Ideally,
these racial identities should be irrelevant to our dealings with
one another. Yet clearly they are not. As a result, all kinds of
circumstances, having nothing to do with "racial preferences,"
require a government to depart from the strictly "color-blind"
treatment of its citizens in order to discharge its legitimate func-
tion. A front page story in the October 28,1996 San Francisco Chron-
icle makes the point nicely. Reporting on an FBI investigation into
excessive fighting among inmates at the Corcoran California state
prison, the story traces the trouble to "an obscure prison edict is-
sued during the 1980s-the integrated yard policyellipsis[which]
required all prison yards to be integrated by race and gang affilia-
tion." This article quotes a veteran prison guard calling that policy
"naive and stupidellipsis[A]nybody that's worked inside a prison
would say that." Yet for a prison warden to allocate exercise time
among inmates as to minimize racial conflict, he would have to
behave in something other than a color-blind manner.
This example is not trivial. In the summer of 1996, the con-
servative federal judge Richard Posner (in Wittmer v. Peters, Nos.
95-3729, 95-4034 (7 th Cir. July 2, 1996)) upheld the preferential
hiring of a black prison guard in an Illinois boot camp for young
offenders. He argued that, with an inmate population that was
three-quarters black, and given that "aversive training" methods
familiar to marine enlistees were to be employed at the boot
camp, the state might have a compelling and thus constitutionally
justifiable interest in providing for some racial diversity in the
camp's officer corps.
138 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Faced with such examples, supporters of the "color-blind"
position invariably reply that race here simply serves as a proxy
for some non-racial trait-like the ability to win the trust of
black inmates. But this response is insufficient, for the crux of the
matter is not the state's use of race as a proxy for some desirable
characteristic in an employee, but rather some citizens' tendency
to view the world through a racially tinted lens. In the boot camp,
a young inmate is bullied mercilessly by guards who either have
his best interests at heart or do not. When black youths refuse
to believe that this bullying is for some useful purpose when
none of the guards are black, then the success of the training
technique requires racial diversity on the staff. And this is true
no matter how sophisticated the prison personnel office may be
at discovering, without using race, whether an applicant "truly
cares" about his prospective charges.
B. Race Conveys Information
Another reason to care about racial inequality is that race is
an important source of information in many situations. Race is
an easily observable trait that, as an empirical matter, is corre-
lated with some hard-to-observe traits about which employers,
lenders, police officers and others are concerned.3 Direct evidence
from employer interviews indicates that both black and white
employers are reluctant to hire black, urban young males who
exhibit lower-class behavioral styles. Racial identity is also used
as information in a variety of ways by police. Some evidence
indicates that it shapes their law enforcement decisions. Indeed,
the dramatic disparity between the races in the rates of arrest and
incarceration for criminal offenses must be taken into account
when discussing racial differences in the labor market experi-
ences of males, thought the direction of causality is difficult to
untangle.
Racial-statistical discrimination can be quite damaging to
both the efficiency of market allocations and to equity This is due
to the very real possibility that the empirically valid statistical
generalizations lying at the heart of such discrimination can be
self-fulfilling prophecies. There is an informational externality
present whenever decision takers take actions based on group
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inferences. It is not difficult to give straightforward economic
accounts of how this process might work in a variety of contexts.
Suppose only a few taxi drivers will pick up young black men
after a certain hour. Given that behavior by taxi drivers as a class, it
is plausible through a process of adverse selection that the "types"
of young black men who will attempt to hail taxis during those
hours contain an especially large fraction of potential robbers.
This makes it rational to avoid them. But if most drivers willingly
picked up young black men, then this behavior might induce
a less threatening set of black males to select taxi transportation
after dark, confirming the rationality of the drivers' more tolerant
behavior.
Or, suppose employers have an a-priori belief that blacks are
more likely to be low effort trainees than are whites. Then, they
will set a lower threshold for blacks on the number of mistakes
needed to trigger dismissal, since they will be quicker to infer
that black workers have not tried hard enough to learn the job.
But knowing that they are more likely to be fired for making a few
mistakes, more black employees may elect not to exert high effort
during the training period in the first place, thus confirming the
employers' initial beliefs.
Or, if car dealers believe that black buyers have higher reser-
vation prices than whites, then dealers will be tougher when
bargaining with blacks than with whites. Given this experience of
tough bargaining, a black buyer anticipates less favorable alterna-
tive opportunities and higher search costs than a white buyer, and
so may rationally agree to a higher price. This behavior confirms
the dealers' initial presumption that "color" predicts bargaining
power.
Such stories are not difficult to produce, and at least to my ear,
they have a certain ring of truth about them. The key to all of these
examples is their self-reinforcing nature: they begin with racial
beliefs that then bring about their own statistical confirmation.
These examples are not unrelated to the historical problems of
race, as they have developed in our society. Race is an easily
discernable characteristic that has salience in our culture, making
it operate powerfully in many venues because it is common
knowledge that people are taking it into account.
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C. Social Networks
Yet another reason to care about racial inequality is that race
influences the social networks that are open to individuals, and
these networks in turn have a major effect upon individuals'
opportunities.4 Here are two observations that illustrate the key to
my argument: First, all societies exhibit significant social segmen-
tation. People make choices about whom to befriend, whom to
marry, where to live, to which schools to send their children and
so on. Factors like race, ethnicity, social class, and religious affili-
ation influence these choices of association. Second, the processes
through which individuals develop their productive capacities
are shaped by custom, convention, and social norms, and are
not fully responsive to market forces, or reflective of the innate
abilities of persons. Networks of social affiliation are not usually
the result of calculated economic decisions. They nevertheless
help determine how resources important to the development of
the productive capacities of human beings are made available to
individuals.
One can say that an adult worker with a given degree of
personal efficacy has been "produced" from the "inputs" of edu-
cation, parenting skills, acculturation, nutrition, and socialization
to which he was exposed in his formative years. While some of
these "inputs" can be bought and sold, some of the most crucial
"factors of production" are only available as by-products from
activities of social affiliation. Parenting services are not to be
had for purchase on the market, but accrue as the consequence
of the social relations between the custodial parents and the
child. The allocation of parenting services among a prospective
generation of adults is thus the indirect consequence of social
activities undertaken by members of the preceding generation.
An adolescent's peer group is similarly a derivative consequence
of processes of social networking.
I concede that this is an artificial way of thinking about human
development, but the artifice is quite useful. For it calls attention
to the critical role played by social and cultural resources in the
production and reproduction of economic inequality. The rele-
vance of such factors, as an empirical matter, is beyond doubt.
The importance of networks, contacts, social background, family
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connections, and informal associations of all kinds has been am-
ply documented by students of social stratification.
I can put this somewhat less abstractly. There is one view of
society in which we are atomistic individuals, all of us pursuing
our own paths to the best of our ability, given the opportunities
available in the marketplace. Some of us work harder, some are
luckier, some are more talented than others, and so the outcomes
are not equal. That is one view, but it is a false, or at least an
incomplete, view of the way in which our society actually works.
For the fact is that each and every one of us is embedded in a
complex web of associations, networks, and contacts. We live
in families, we belong in communities, and we are members of
collectivities of one kind or another. We are influenced by these
associations from the very first day that we draw breath. Our
development-what and who we are become-is nourished by
these associations.
It is a severe disadvantage to be born to parents who are not
interested in your development. It is a great impediment for a
talented youngster to be embedded in a social network of peers
whose values do not affirm the activities the youngster must
undertake to develop his talent. Children do not freely choose
their peers. To a significant degree they inherit these associations
as a consequence of where they live, what their parents believe,
what social group they belong to, and so on. In American society,
given our history, racial identity is one important component of
that complex of social characteristics that define the networks
in which we live. Opportunity travels along the synapses of
these networks. We learn about what we can do with our talents
from the conversation taking place over dinner, from the family
friend who says "Why doesn't your kid do this or that?," from
the business owner who offers a summer job. These kinds of
opportunity-enhancing associations are not just out there in the
marketplace to be purchased by the highest bidder. Nor are they
allocated randomly so as to create some kind of level playing
field.
RACIAL JUSTICE
Now as someone who values liberty it is my view that we
cannot and should not seek to equalize for all persons access to
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such networks of social affiliation. They are to a large degree the
inheritance of history, and we must take them as they come. But
we do not have to accept the inegalitarian consequences of these
structures without reflection, nor must we impute naturalness or
an inevitability to those unequal consequences.
We do not, in other words, have to take one seventeen-year-
old who has grown up in a suburban, affluent, two-parent family
with wholesome neighbors and peers, attending schools that
work, and compare him with another seventeen-year-old who
has grown up under less felicitous circumstances, and then stamp
on the forehead of the former the big "M" for merit and say of the
latter, "He has not earned the right to further develop his talents."
When it comes time to allocate state-funded opportunities for
the intellectual development of the two youngsters, we need
not pretend that the playing field has been level all the time
and that, by favoring the first kid, we are merely giving scarce
opportunities to the most deserving recipient.
I am arguing that inalienable non-marketed social and cul-
tural resources play a critical role in the production and repro-
duction of economic inequality. In this context, it is crucial to
realize that even the values, attitudes and beliefs held by an
individual-of central import for the attainment of success in
life-are shaped by the cultural milieu in which that person de-
velops. Whom one knows affects what one comes to believe, and in
that way influences what one can do with one's God-given talents.
Do we collectively, as a society, have any responsibility for the
debilitating, even pathological cultural milieus that exist in our
midst? This is an important component of the racial inequality of
our day. Are these subcultures of despair just facts of nature about
"those people," toward whom the rest of us have no obligations
whatsoever? Or are they products of a history in which we are
implicated?
My claim here is that the "social pathology' to be observed in
some quarters for our society did not come out of thin air, but to
some extent is a consequence of historical practices, including, in
the case of blacks, the practice of racial oppression' Moreover, the
ongoing racial segmentation of our society-most clearly visible
in the social isolation of today's urban black poor-is an impor-
tant social inequity that helps to perpetuate the consequences of
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our troubled racial history. I believe this analysis has an important
ethical implication: Because the creation of a skilled workforce is a
social process, the meritocratic ideal-that in a free society individuals
should be allowed to rise to the level of their competence-should be
tempered with an understanding that no one travels that road alone. We
should not embrace the notion that individuals have "merit" that
must be rewarded without some awareness of the processes by
which that merit is produced. Theses are social processes, with
a racial dimension. It should be evident that, notwithstanding
the establishment of a legal regime or equal opportunity, histor-
ically engendered economic differences between racial groups
could well persist into the indefinite future, and not as some
have argued, perniciously, because of the genetic inferiority of
blacks. Thus, the pronounced racial disparities to be observed
in American cities are, at least, in part, the product of an unjust
history, propagated across the generations by segmented social
structures of our race conscious society. This is what I mean by
the problem of racial injustice.
For this reason I would argue that, as a matter of social ethics
and social science, there should be collective public effort to mit-
igate the economic marginality of those who are languishing in
the ghettos of America. Prevailing social affiliations, including
the extent of racial segregation in our society, influence the de-
velopment of the intellectual and personal skills of the young.
As a result, the, patterns of inequality-among individuals and
between groups-must embody, to some degree, social and eco-
nomic disparities that have existed in the past. To the extent that
past disparities reflect overt racial exclusion, the propriety of the
contemporary order is called into question.
I stress that this is not a reparations argument. I am not saying
that some individuals are due something because of what was
done to their ancestors. Neither is this a group entitlement argu-
ment, in which racial collectivities are seen as having "rights" that
take precedence over those of individuals. Indeed, my argument
here is entirely consistent with individualism as a core philosoph-
ical premise. I am simply acknowledging the additional fact that
in society, people are not atoms. They are, rather situated within
systems of mutual affiliation. And in our society, these systems
are defined, in part, by race.
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Taking note of this situatedness and understanding its his-
torical roots leads me to some recognition of race as a legitimate
factor in consideration of social justice. When the developmental
prospects of individuals depend on the circumstances of those
with whom they are socially affiliated, and when social affiliation
reflects a tendency toward racial segregation, even a minimal
commitment to equality of opportunity for individuals can re-
quire, I am arguing, a willingness to take racial identity into
account. In our divided society, given our tragic past, this implies
that public efforts to counter the effects of historical disadvan-
tage among blacks are not only consistent with, but indeed are
required by widely embraced, individualistic, democratic ideals.
COLOR BLIND EXTREMISTS
This argument leads naturally to the question of whether
affirmative-action policies are necessary and justified. To em-
phasize that racial group disparities can be transmitted across
generations through subtle and complex social processes is not
necessarily to endorse employment or educational preferences
based on race. But recognizing the importance of social segmen-
tation does cause one to doubt the ethical viability, and indeed
the logical coherence, of "color-blind absolutism"-the notion
that the Constitution requires government agents to ignore the
racial identity of citizens. Ironically, recent claims by some con-
servatives 6 to this effect bear an eerie resemblance, in form and in
substance, to the similarly absolute claims of some card-carrying
civil libertarians on behalf of a "wall of separation" between
church and state.
Consider that, as a practical matter, the government cannot
enforce laws against employment discrimination without taking
note of a gross demographic imbalance in an employer's work
force. Yet, the government's requiring that employment data be
reported by race is already a departure from pure color-blind
behavior. So too is the practice, nearly universal in the public and
private sectors, of targeted outreach efforts designed to increase
the representation of blacks in the pool of persons considered for
an employment opportunity Accordingly, the more intellectually
consistent of the color-blind absolutists now recommend, as logic
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would require, that we repeal the civil-rights laws and abandon
even those efforts to achieve racial diversity which do not involve
preferential treatment. But is that stance consistent with fairness?
Coming up with cases that challenge the absolutist claim is not
difficult. How can a college educator convey to students the lesson
that "not all blacks think alike," with too few blacks on campus
for this truth to be evident? Can the police consider race when
making undercover assignments? Can a black public employee
use health insurance benefits to choose a black therapist with
whom to discuss race-related anxieties? Can units in a public
housing project be let with an eye to sustaining a racially inte-
grated environment? What about a National Science Foundation
that encourages gifted blacks to pursue careers in the fields where
few now study? Clearly, there is no general rule that can resolve
all of these case reasonably.
COSTS OF RACIAL PREFERENCES
I want to be clear. This criticism of color-blind absolutism is
not an unqualified defense of the affirmative action status quo.
There are many reasons to suspect that in particular contexts
the costs of using racial preferences will outweigh the benefits.7
One such reason for questioning the wisdom of affirmative action
in certain contexts is that the widespread use of preference can
logically be expected to erode the perception of black competence.
This point is often misunderstood, so it is worth spelling out
in some detail. The argument is not a speculation about the
feelings of persons who may or may not be the beneficiaries
of affirmative action. Rather, it turns on the rational, statistical
inferences that neutral observers are entitled to make about the
unknown qualifications of persons who may have been preferred,
or rejected, in a selection process.
The main insight is not difficult to grasp. Let some employer
use a lower threshold of assessed productivity for the hiring of
blacks than whites. The preferential hiring policy defines three
categories of individuals within each of the two racial groups
which I will call "marginals," "successes," and "failures." Mar-
ginals are those whose hiring status is altered by the policy-
either whites not hired who otherwise would have been, or blacks
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hired who otherwise would not have been. Successes are those
who would be hired with or without the policy, and failures are
those who would be passed over with or without the preferential
policy. Let us consider how an outsider who can observe the hir-
ing decision, but not the employer's productivity assessment, would
estimate the productivity of those subject to this hiring process.
Notice that a lower hiring threshold for blacks causes the
outside market to reduce its estimate of the productivity of black
successes, since, on average, less is required to achieve that status.
In addition, black failures, seen to have been passed over despite
a lower hiring threshold, are thereby revealed as especially un-
productive. On the other hand, a hiring process favoring blacks
must enhance the reputations of white failures, as seen by out-
siders, since they may have been artificially held back. And white
successes, who are hired despite being disfavored in selection,
have thereby been shown to be especially productive.
We have thus reached the result that, among blacks, only
marginals gain from the establishment of a preferential hiring
program-they do so because the outside observer lumps them
together with black successes. They thus gain a job and a bet-
ter reputation than they objectively deserve. Moreover, among
whites, only marginals are harmed by the program, for only
they lose the chance of securing a job and only they see their
reputations harmed by virtue of being placed in the same category
as white failures. In practical terms, since marginals are typically
a minority of all workers, the outside reputations of most blacks
will be lowered, and that of most whites enhanced, by preferential
hiring. The inferential logic that leads to this arresting conclusion
is particularly insidious, in that it can serve to legitimate otherwise
indefensible negative stereotypes about blacks.
Another reason for being skeptical about the practice of af-
firmative action is that it can undercut the incentives for blacks
to develop their competitive abilities. For instance, preferential
treatment can lead to the patronization of black workers and
students. By "patronization," I mean the setting of lower stan-
dards of expected accomplishment for blacks than for whites
because of the belief that blacks are not as capable of meeting
a higher, common standard. In the 1993 article "Will Affirmative
Action eliminate Negative Stereotypes?"8, Stephen Coate and I
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show how behavior of this kind can be based on a self-fulfilling
prophesy That is, observed performance among blacks may be
lower precisely because blacks are being patronized, a policy that
is undertaken because of the need for an employer or admissions
officer to meet affirmative-action guidelines.
Consider a workplace in which a supervisor operating under
some affirmative-action guidelines must recommend subordi-
nate workers for promotion. Suppose further that he is keen to
promote blacks where possible, and that he monitors his subor-
dinates' performance and bases his recommendations on these
observations. Pressure to promote blacks might lead him to de-
emphasize deficiencies in the performance of black subordinates,
recommending them for promotion when he would not have
done so for whites. But his behavior could undermine the ability
of black workers to identify and correct their deficiencies. They
are denied honest feedback from their supervisor on their per-
formance and are encouraged to think that one can get ahead
without attaining the same degree of proficiency as whites.
Alternatively, consider a population of students applying to
professional schools for admissions. The schools, due to affirma-
tive action concerns, are eager to admit a certain percentage of
blacks. They believe that to do so they must accept black appli-
cants with test scores and grades below those of some whites
whom they reject. If most schools follow this policy, the message
sent out to black students is that the level of performance needed
to gain admission is lower than that which white students know
they must attain. If black and white students are, at least to some
extent, responsive to these differing expectations, they might, as a
result, achieve grades and test scores reflective of the expectation
gap. In this way, the schools' belief that different admissions
standards are necessary becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy
DEVELOPMENTAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The common theme in these two examples is that the desire
to see greater black representation is pursued by using different
criteria for the promotion or admission of black and white candi-
dates. But the use of different criteria reduces the incentives that
blacks have for developing needed skills. This argument does not
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presume that blacks are less capable than whites; it is based on
the fact that an individual's need to make use of his abilities is
undermined when that individual is patronized by the employer
or the admissions committee.
This problem could be avoided if, instead of using different
criteria of selection, the employers and schools in question sought
to meet their desired level of black participation through a con-
certed effort to enhance performance, while maintaining common
standards of evaluation. Call it "developmental," as opposed to
"preferential," affirmative action. Such a targeted effort as per-
formance enhancement among black employees or students is
definitely not color-blind behavior. It presumes a direct concern
about racial inequality and involves allocating benefits on the
basis of race. What distinguishes it from preferential hiring or
admissions, though, is that it takes seriously the fact of differential
performance and seeks to reverse it directly, rather than trying to
hide from that fact by setting a different threshold of expectations
for the performance of blacks.
For example, given that black students are far scarcer than
white and Asian students in the fields of math and science, en-
couraging their entry into these areas without lowering standards
-through summer workshops, support for curriculum develop-
ment at historically black colleges, or the financing of research
assistantships for promising graduate students-would be
consistent with my distinction between "preferential" and "de-
velopmental" affirmative action. Also consistent would be the
provision of management assistance to new black-owned busi-
nesses, which would then be expected to bid competitively for
government contracts, or the provisional admission of black stu-
dents to the state university, conditional on their raising their
academic scores to competitive levels after a year or two of study
at a local community college. The key is that the racially targeted
assistance be short-lived and preparatory to the entry of its recip-
ients into an arena of competition where they would be assessed
in the same way as everyone else.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I am arguing that if our interest is achieving a
just society, then there is nothing in the sorry history of affirmative
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action abuses that requires us to tie our hands with a color-
blind formalism. Consider the common sense observation that, in
this country, an army where blacks are one-third of the enlisted
personnel but only three percent of the officer corps is likely to
function poorly. The U.S. Army cares about the number of black
captains because it needs to sustain effective cooperation among
its personnel across racial lines. That the racial identities of cap-
tains and corporals sometimes matters to the smooth functioning
of a military institution is a deep fact about our society, one that
cannot be wished away.' Now, monitoring the number of blacks
promoted to the rank of captain, and formulating policies to
increase that number, are activities that inherently involve taking
account of some individual's race. Yet, depending on how they
are undertaken, such activities need not entail the promulgation
of racial double standards, nor need they seem to declare, as a
matter of official policy, that racial identity is a determinant of
an individual's moral worth. As the military sociologist Charles
Moskos is fond of pointing out, the Army is the only place in
American society where large numbers of whites routinely take
orders from blacks. Ironically, the irrelevance of race to a per-
son's moral worth may be more evident to the members of this
institution than elsewhere in our society precisely because the
government has taken account of race in the conduct of its military
personnel policies.
The color-blind principle, while consistent as a self-contained
legal rule, is in my opinion neither morally nor politically coher-
ent. It requires that we not care about racial inequality, per se,
when, as I have argued above, there are many compelling rea-
sons to reject that position. For instance, the color-blind principle
would seem to imply that we should discontinue all racial classi-
fications associated with the collection of government statistics.
To what proper use could the agencies possibly put the racial
information-on crime, housing, employment, welfare receipt,
test scores-which they collect? Yet, monitoring the racial dimen-
sion of social and economic trends is an obviously vital public
function. Why? For one reason, consider that these data are the
sole source of our knowledge that discrimination has declined
over the years, a key aspect of the case for reforming the practice
of affirmative action. Moreover, without these data, the vast over
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representation of blacks among imprisoned felons in this country
could not be rationalized in such a way as to refute the charge of
systematic racism in the administration of criminal justice. These
examples illustrate how, despite the moral irrelevance of race at
the individual level, there remains an operational need to attend
to racial disparity in the conduct of our public affairs.
Moreover, as I have suggested, racially targeted recruitment
and racially defined anti-discrimination enforcement mechan-
isms inevitably entail a form of mild "reverse discrimination,"
because they guarantee a labor market environment in which
the targeted group receives more favorable treatment. Color-
blind employment policy, if faithfully and uniformly pursued,
must mean the abolition of racial representation as a goal. (See,
eg., the recent Silberman decision for DC Circuit in Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod v. Federal Communications Commission,
No. 97-1116 (D.C. Cir. September 15, 1998), where a federal judge
seems prepared to go this far.)
All of this shows the confusion of those color-blind advocates
who offer the criminalization of employment discrimination as
a quid pro quo for the abolition of affirmative action. Jailing
employers for not finding enough black workers would only
lead to a dramatic increase in the amount of covert, reverse
discrimination against white job-seekers. Indeed, since all anti-
discrimination enforcement requires classifying, monitoring, and
counting employees by race, the only fully consistent color-blind
position is to advocate the repeal of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
I respect the intellectual consistency, but doubt the moral probity
of those like Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago Law
School, who so advocate.
NOTES
1. This point is developed more fully in Loury (March 1998).
2. The discussion in this section draws on Loury (August 1998).
3. For a more complete discussion, see Loury (Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Spring 1998).
4. These ideas are developed more fully in Loury (1997).
5. For a more complete argument in this vein, see Loury, Brookings Review, Spring
1998.
6. For example, America in Black and White (1997) by Abigail and Stephan
Thernstrom.
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7. See Loury (Spring 1997).
8. See Coate and Loury (1993).
9. See All that We Can Be (1997), by Charles Moskos and John Sibley Butler, for
an informative discussion of affirmative action in the U.S. Army.
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